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“RISK SOCIETY” AND THE PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH IN RECENT AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN AND
UK JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Filip Gelev*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, without being suspected of committing or planning to commit
any crime in Australia, a federal court issued a “control order” against Mr
Jack Thomas “to protect the public and substantially assist in preventing a
terrorist act”. The court was of the view that unless the order was made
“Mr Thomas's knowledge and skills could provide a potential resource for
the planning or preparation of a terrorist act.”1 Mr Thomas admitted that
before 9/11 he trained with in an Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and
continued his connection with Taliban sympathisers up until January 2003
when he was arrested in Pakistan.2 In October 2008 Mr Thomas was
acquitted by a jury in another court of the charge of accepting funds from
a terrorist organisation.3 He is still subject to a control order.4
*

This paper is an abridged and updated version of the author’s master’s thesis completed
at the Vrije Universiteit (Free University), Amsterdam in June 2008. The author wishes to
thank his thesis supervisor Prof. dr. Wouter Werner for his boundless patience,
enthusiasm, wisdom and guidance.
1

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194, 201; [2007] HCA 33, [1]. Most court cases
below are referenced using the case neutral citation with paragraph numbers in square
brackets and, where the case is reported, we also use the relevant law reports page
numbers (eg Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [39]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 545). For
some older cases (referred to only a few times) we utilise the official law report reference
without the case neutral citation (eg Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth
(1951) 83 CLR 1).
2

3

R v Thomas (No 3) 14 VR 512.

He was convicted of falsifying a passport. See Milanda Rout, “Jack Thomas Acquitted
on Al-Qa’ida Charge but Guilty of Falsifying Passport”, The Australian, 23 October

2
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From 2003 until 2005, without being suspected of committing or planning
to commit any crimes in Canada in the immediate future, Mr Adil
Charkaoui was detained as a danger to the security of Canada because,
among other things, he was a karate enthusiast. The court agreed with the
executive government: “In the past, it has been observed that some
individuals involved with Al-Qaeda are devoted to the practice of karate
and/or the martial arts” most notably one of 9/11 hijackers.5
In 2006, the judiciary in the UK confirmed a control order against MB, the
basis of which was not the suspicion that he may have committed a crime,
but to prevent him from travelling from the UK to Iraq where he allegedly
wanted to fight against Coalition Forces.6
Theses three cases epitomise “preventative” or “preventive” justice. The
law is employed as an instrument for prevention, not as punishment for
past acts (eg an attempted bombing) or adjudication of a legal dispute
about an individual’s rights (eg the right to remain in a country). More
interestingly, they are examples of the judiciary engaging in legal
reasoning through which it fills the gaps in the executive’s deployment of
preventative justice.
There is now a body of scholarly work in International Relations based on
Ulrich Becks’ risk society and the associated ideas of precaution and
prevention, and Michel Foucault’s ideas on governmentality, critiquing the
expansion of executive power in general and in national security matters
related to the ‘war on terrorism’ in particular.

2008. Accessed on 1 November 2008 at
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24540864-601,00.html.
4

Personal conversation between the author and the legal firm representing Mr Thomas on
18 November 2008.

5

Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [50]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 548-9.

6

MB v Home Secretary [2006] EWHC 1000, [20].
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Governments across the world pass new laws or seek to utilise existing
powers in new ways to proscribe organisations, detain people without trial,
increase border controls, accumulate vast amount of data, freeze assets and
so on.7 Werner and Johns see the logic of precaution in different measures
and policies, e.g., the anticipatory use of force, the blacklisting of
individuals, targeted killings, profiling and surveillance, and preventative
detention.8
In this context, some International Relations scholars have argued that the
judiciary’s proper role is to act as a counter-balance to executive, and to a
lesser extent parliamentary overreach,9 or as a guardian of human rights.10
Little attention has been paid to judicial reasoning allowing or even
reinforcing these governmentality practices. The main question we pose in
this article is whether, and if so how, the discourse of risk and the
precautionary approach affect the argumentative structure and substance
of judicial decision making. Our hypothesis is that it is simplistic to see
the judiciary as a watchdog keeping the other branches of government in
check and that the courts’ role is much more limited both in practice and
as perceived by members of the judiciary.

7

C. Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of
Constitutionalism”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395, 1400.
8

W. Werner and F. Johns, (2008) 21(4) “The Risks of International Law”, Leiden
Journal of International Law 783, 784-5

9

Sometimes no specific distinction is drawn between actions of the executive and the
legislature. See eg J. McCuloch, “Contemporary Comments. Australia’s Anti-Terrorism
Legislation and the Jack Thomas Case”, (2006) 18(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice
357.
10

D. Hovell, “Black Holes or Loopholes? Human Rights in the Risk Society”, HREOC
Seminar, Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law, UNSW (6 April 2005). Last accessed
on
7
April
2008
at
www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/Publications/docs/pubs/2005_BlackHolesorLoopholes.doc.
See also D. Dyzenhaus, “Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and
the Adjudication of National Security”, (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 1.

4
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The paper consists of two sections. In the first section we discuss the ideas
of Ulrich Beck and Michel Foucault as they relate to preventative justice
and then we turn to the role of the judiciary in times of emergency,
including the post 9/11 war on terror. In the second section we turn to the
case-law to focus on how the discourse of risk, precaution and prevention
permeate legal reasoning.
The case-law comprises six sets of cases,11 i.e., two sets from three
countries each – Australia, Canada and the UK, at the highest level
available.12 We selected the cases, first, because they are all from the
common law legal family. The legal systems of the three countries are
close enough to provide meaningful parallels and different enough to
argue that any common trends are due to broad philosophical and doctrinal
trends. Secondly, we looked for common themes such as preventative
laws. The cases are organised thematically under the following headings:
Preventative justice (2.1), Human rights and precaution (2.2) and
Sovereignty v global threats and solutions (2.3).13
This publication is not meant as a standard legal analysis of the cases, that
is, for example, an analysis of who was successful in the legal proceedings
(or who in our view should have been successful) or whether parts of the
relevant laws were declared invalid (or whether in our view they should
have been declared invalid).14 One cannot draw definite conclusions from
11

Some of the ‘sets’ include decisions at several different levels of the judicial system
and civil as well as criminal proceedings. Some of the UK and Canadian cases involved
more than one individual in each case.

12

Out of the 6 sets of proceedings, Haneef is the only one not decided by the highest
court of appeal of the relevant country.

13

This article is an abridged version of my masters thesis. In the thesis there were no
themes. Instead, I went through an analysis of the six cases, one after the other.

14

For an analysis of Thomas see E. MacDonald, E. and G. Williams, “Combatting
Terrorism: Australia’s Criminal Code Since September 11”, (2007) 16 Griffith Law
Review
27.
Last
accessed
on
28
May
2008
at
http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publications/docs/pubs/Terrorism_Criminal_Law2.pdf.
For an analysis of Charkaoui see T. Poole, “Recent Developments in the War on
Terrorism in Canada” (2008) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review 633. For an analysis of JJ,
MB, and E, see C. Forsyth “Control Orders, Conditions Precedent and Compliance with
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a small sample of six cases. Nevertheless, in the conclusion we argue that
one can discern a pattern in the way courts approach the fight against
terrorism.

A. ULRICH BECK AND RISK SOCIETY
Since Ulrich Beck’s book Risk Society appeared in English in 1992
discussions of risk have become ubiquitous in many different disciplines.15
According to Beck today we live in “risk society” characterised by
uncontrollable risks, which are not merely unnatural and human-made but
beyond boundaries.16 Unlike governments in industrial society which
sought to ensure the distribution of goods, in risk society the aim is to
achieve the prevention of “bads” – pollution, global pandemics or nuclear
disasters17 – but these common bads can no longer be contained spatially
or temporally.18 The attacks of 11 September 2001 led Beck to add
Art 6(1)”, (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal” 1 and D. Feldman, “Deprivation of
Liberty in Anti-Terrorism Law”, (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal” 4. For a brief
overview of the “character test” (the Haneef case) see S. Harris Rimmer, “Character as
Destiny: The dangers of character tests in Commonwealth law”, A talk given at the
Weekend of Ideas, Manning Clark House, The Australia Institute (29 March 2008). Last
accessed
on
29
May
2008
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=susan_harris_rimm
er. For Suresh see D.W. Elliot “Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative Law:
Time for the Tailor?” (2002) 65 Saskatchewan Law Review 469 and M. Coutu and M-H.
Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security before the Supreme Court
of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 313. Finally, for Rehman
see D. Bonner and R. Cholewinski, “The Response of the United Kingdom’s Legal and
Constitutional Orders to the 1991 Gulf War and the Post-9/11 ‘War’ on Terrorism” in E.
Guild and A. Baldaccini (eds.) Terrorism and the Foreigner. A decade of tension around
the rule of law in Europe, (2007) Leiden: Nijhoff, 2007, 123-175.
15

G. Mythen, “Reappraising the Risk Society Thesis: Telescopic Sight or Myopic
Vision?”, (2007) 55(3) Current Sociology 793-813, 793-4.

16

U. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited” (2002) 19(4) Theory,
Culture & Society 39-55, 41.

17

U. Beck, 1992, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage, 49.

6
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terrorism to the list of different “dimensions” or “dynamics” of world risk
society.19
A key idea associated with risk theory is that decision makers should take
precautionary measures to prevent or minimise harm in circumstances
where there is uncertainty about the exact nature and extent of the risk.20
Risk society is global and universal21 and nobody is safe against
phenomena such as pandemics, terrorist acts or global warming. When a
risk, such as a nuclear explosion, eventuates it has catastrophic or
irremediable effects.22 New technologies and the advances in science do
not minimise but rather multiply risks; “genetic engineering,
nanotechnology and robotics” open new Pandora’s boxes.23 Because of the
potentially disastrous scale of, for example, a terrorist attack, governments
consider any chance that such an event may occur, no matter how small
the probability, to be unacceptable, that is, “any degree of likelihood [is]
too great to tolerate”. Ron Suskind has called this the One Per Cent

18

G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(23) Security Dialogue 221, 223. It is hard to pinpoint the exact time when ‘risk society’
supposedly came into existence, but I am more concerned with the post 9/11 period when
terrorism ‘joined’ the myriad of other risks.
19

U. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited”, (2002) 19(4) Theory,
Culture & Society 39, 39-40

20

P. O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, Glasshouse Press: New York, 2004,

3.
21

G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Criminology and Terrorism. Which Thesis? Risk Society
or Governmentality?” (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 379, 384.

22

G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(23) Security Dialogue 221, 224.

23

U. Beck “The Silence of Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society”
(2002) 1 Logos 1, 9.
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Doctrine. Governments are guided by no more than “actionable suspicion”
in the quest to prevent unknown disasters.24
Thus, at the heart of risk society there is an unresolvable paradox because
“while risk has been enormously productive of institutions, technologies
of the self and new commodities, precaution is said to offer nothing.”25
Furthermore, some precautionary measures may be effective some of the
time but, as Rasmussen puts it, “risks are infinite because they multiply
over time since one can always do more to prevent them from becoming
real.” 26 As a result executive governments are forced to “feign control
over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy
and everyday life.”27
The application of the principles of precaution in relation to terrorism
assumes that terrorists act in a random and irrational manner,28 similar to a
virus, or a genetic mutation, which makes it impossible for governments to
know what anticipatory measures to take. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
acts, some have argued that “anything, anywhere is at risk.”29

24

R. Suskind, The One Per Cent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies
Since 9/11, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, 166 as cited in M. de Goede, “The
Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008) 14(1) European Journal
of International Relations 161, 164.

25

P. O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, Glasshouse Press: New York, 2004,
178.

26

M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the
Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, 4.

27

U. Beck “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisted” (2002) 19(4) Theory,
Culture & Society 39–55, 43.
28

G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(23) Security Dialogue 221, 225-6.

29

M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the
Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, 4.

8
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Governments are caught in a vicious cycle of their own creation: they
must invent newer and ever more frantic measures whose effectiveness is
both impossible to measure and perceived as inherently transient.30 To
borrow the former US Defence Secretary’s phraseology, the risk of
terrorism is managed as “an unknown unknown”, a thing we do not know
we do not know.31
Philip Bobbitt describes the way the West, and the US in particular, will
be fighting ‘terror’ in the 21st century and introduces the term
“preclusion”:32
Taking decisions to preclude a state of terror – whether by
arresting a would-be terrorist who has yet to commit a crime, [or]
by pre-empting a state that has yet to complete its acquisition of
WMD … depends upon estimates of the future. Rarely before have
governments had to rely so heavily on speculation about the future
because a failure to act in time could have such irrevocable
consequences.
In the second section of this article we seek to demonstrate that courts
sometimes adopt this view as well. This exercise in precaution turns on its
head the principle that judicial power is about deciding “existing rights
and duties... according to law. That is to say, it does so by the application
30

M. Welch, “Sovereign impunity in America’s war on terror: examining reconfigured
power and the absence of accountability”, (2007) 47 Crime, Law and Social Change 135150, 137
31

BBC News, “Rum remark wins Rumsfled an award”, 2 December 2003.

Last accessed on 30 May 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm. The
full comment was “Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always
interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we
don't know we don't know”. Last accessed on 30 May 2008 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm.
32

Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2008, 291.

2009]

“RISK SOCIETY”

9

of a pre-existing standard rather than by the formulation of policy or the
exercise of an administrative discretion.“33 Critics of laws based on
precaution have claimed that “[w]e are witnessing the end of criminal
law”34 and courts are part and parcel of this phenomenon.
Risk society theory, and the precautionary principle, provides a useful
analytical tool in relation to judicial decision making post 9/11. In some
cases courts adopt the language of risk society even though it is more
likely than not that the judges are not aware of the ideas of Ulrich Beck. A
good example is Thomas, a case analysed further in Section 2. In oral
argument counsel for the executive government, compared terrorism to the
threat of “invaders from outer space”, “a rogue asteroid” hitting Australia
or “migratory birds infected with avian flu.”35
The High Court of Australia adopted this discourse of risk society, on
occasions verbatim from the executive government’s (as the respondent in
the litigation) oral submissions, eg eight reasons36 which present an
apocalyptic picture of what made Australia “particularly vulnerable” to a

33

Brandy v Human Rights Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 268 as
cited in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, Kirby J [306].
34

Richard Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World, 2006 as cited in Andrew Goldsmith,
“Preparation for Terrorism: Catastrophic Risk and Precautionary Criminal Law” A.
Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror,
Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 59-74, at 60.

35

Transcript of hearing in the case of Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 76 (20
February 2007). Last accessed on 28 April 2008 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/76.html.
36

Thomas v Mowbray per Heydon J, (2007) 237 ALR 194, 370-371; [2007] HCA 33,
[647].

10

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

terrorist attack.37 Australia faced an unprecedented and “frightening
combination of circumstances”:38
The scale and almost inestimable capacity of accessible, modern,
destructive technology to cause harm, render attempts to draw
analogies with historical atrocities … unconvincing.
Counsel for Mr Thomas unsuccessfully argued that the government was
merely making assertions about Australia’s increased vulnerability today
compared to earlier periods in history. One of the High Court justices
responded thus:39
But it is going to escalate. As science discovers more ways of
killing people you are going to get more and more – the threat is
going to increase and it is no good saying, “Well, it was not a
problem in the past”. I mean, each problem is an escalating
problem.
To put the same idea in Foucauldian terms (see below at 1.2), some courts
“govern themselves within the regimes of truth that surround the ‘national
security’ in times of exceptional politics”.40 On a practical level judges do
not want to place national security at risk or be seen to be soft on
(potential) terrorists.
37

In additions, the Solicitor-General of Australia gave “the easy example perhaps of the
terrorist who has access to an atomic weapon and there is a risk that if allowed free he
will place it somewhere and explode it”. Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 76 (20
February 2007). Last accessed on 28 April 2008 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/76.html.

38

Thomas v Mowbray per Callinan J [2007] HCA 33, [544]; (2007) 237 ALR 194, 342.
Also Heydon J, [2007] HCA 33, [648]-[649]; (2007) 237 ALR 194, 371, rejected the
argument that the government was making assertions as to possible future occurrences.

39

Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 78 (21 February 2006). Last accessed on 28
April
2008
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/78.html.

40

V. Jabri, “The Limits of Agency in Times of Emergency” in J. Huysmans, A. Dobson
and R. Prokhovnik (eds.) The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political
Agency, New York: Routledge, 2006, 145.

2009]

“RISK SOCIETY”

11

B. FOUCAULT AND GOVERNMENTALITY
Foucauldian theory yields a somewhat different theoretical analysis of
various preventive justice measures than risk society theory. A
Foucauldian approach focuses on the employing tactics to achieve certain
ends rather than the objective reality, the laws or formal structures of
government.41
Foucauldian theory views power as fragmented, dispersed or decentred42
and within this analytical framework courts do not stand in opposition to
executive governments. The object and activity of government, including
the judiciary, are not given or static; they have to be invented and
learned.43 A “rationality of government” (or “governmentality”) then is
about a “system of thinking about the nature of the practice of
government, capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and
practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was
practised.”44 The other aspect of government, the “technology of
government”, encompasses the practical means through which a rationality
is realised.45

41

M. Foucault, “Governmentality” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991,
87-104, 95.
42

Y.-K. Heng and K. McDonagh, “The other War on Terror revealed: global
governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force’s campaign against terrorist
Financing” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 553-573, 561.

43

G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, x.

44

45

Ibid., 3.

C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 97.
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In this context, a “dispositif” of government consists of the combination of
rationalities and technologies which influence behaviour and
simultaneously “construct forms of ordered agency and subjectivity in the
population to be governed as part of the social problem identified”,46
whether it is global warming, taking action ostensibly to stop a state from
developing weapons of mass destruction, fighting crime (drugs in
particular) or the war on terror. Governmentality is based on perceptions,
not necessarily on realities. Ulrich Beck himself, even though he is
preoccupied with what he sees as a real (not imaginary) risk of terrorism,
wrote soon after 9/11 that:47
What is politically crucial is ultimately not the risk itself but the
perception of the risk. What men fear to be real is real in its
consequences – fear creates its own reality. […] The perceived risk
of terrorism, politically instrumentalised, unleashes security needs,
which wipe out freedom and democracy, the very things which
constitute the superiority of modernity.
Aradau and van Munster identify risk and precaution as being in the centre
of the rationality of government vis-à-vis terrorism. They argue that
“precautionary risk has emerged in the dispositif of risk to govern
terrorism,48 where other technologies have proven fallible or

46

Ibid., 97.

47

U. Beck, “The Cosmopolitan State”, Eurozine, 5 December 2001.

Last accessed on 20 December 2008 at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2001-12-05beck-en.html.
48

Dispositif consists of “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions,
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
philanthropic propositions.” M. Foucault, “The Confessions of the Flesh” in C. Gordon
(ed.) Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, 194–228,
New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, 194 as cited in C. Aradau and R. van Munster,
“Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“,
(2007) 13(1) European Journal of International Relations 89, 97.
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insufficient.”49 They claim that there is a move to “drastic prevention” in
policies ranging from the hunt for Osama bin Laden ‘dead or alive’, the
UK police shoot-to-kill policy, pre-emptive strikes against terrorist targets,
indefinite detention and extraordinary ‘rendition’ to third states or
indefinite detention.50
What is interesting is that most scholars have not only focused their
criticism almost exclusively on the executive but have further declared
their faith in the judiciary’s ability (or at least in the judiciary’s role to
endeavour) to act as a counterbalance to the executive.51
Critics of anti-terrorism measures taken after 9/11 claim that terrorism is a
pretext for cynical executive governments to create “law free zones“ in
which “political will reigns and the rule of law has no purchase“.52
Jef Huysmans says that an essential characteristic of liberal democracies is
that political power is subjugated by the rule of law, i.e., subject to judicial
control.53 Political power exercised by the executive, when left unchecked,
can lead to “the institutionalization of decisionist government”, that is:
49

C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 102.

50

Ibid., 103-104.

51

There are exceptions. Richard V. Ericson in his book Crime in an Insecure World
2006, Polity Press, speaks to the role of courts, among others, in the criminalization
across domains as diverse as national security, social security, corporate security and
domestic security.
52

This view is not universally held. Many scholars, particularly in the US argue that the
precautionary approach is appropriate. For example, Tom Campbell criticises those who
argue that courts should control executive power: “How can this be done without in effect
replacing one lot of guardians with another and making the judges into those officials
whose discretion is determinative”. T. Campbell, “Blaming Legal Positivims: A Reply to
David Dyzenhaus”, (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 31, 32.

53

J. Huysmans, “Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal
Democracy”, (2004) 3(3) Contemporary Political Theory 321, 329.
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[A] reduction of the state to the moment of the decision, to a pure
decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying
itself, that is, to an absolute decision created out of nothingness’.
This nothingness refers to a normative vacuum, that is, absence of
rule of law.54 (footnotes omitted).
Michel Coutu and Marie-Hélène Giroux contrast “normative” and
“decisionist” legitimacy. The former is based on the rule of law and the
compulsory character of legal norms. The latter is essentially political and
alien to the rule of law.55 Thus, “petty sovereigns” within the government
bureaucracy, rather than judges, make “pre-legal security decisions” for
which they are not held to account.56 Clive Walker criticises decisionmaking which is “in the hands of less experienced and more politically
motivated government ministers as opposed to detached judges”.57 In the
context of refugee law, Guy Goodwin-Gill argues against governments
seeking to assume “potentially unaccountable power”, especially since
9/11.58
Even members of the judiciary criticise the executive. The House of
Lords’ Lord Steyn spoke extra-judicially about the executive branch
“often resort[ing] to excessive measures” and then added that the “litany

54

Ibid., 329

55

M. Coutu and M-H. Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security
before the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee
Law 313, 318.

56

M. de Goede, “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008)
14(1) European Journal of International Relations 161, 176.

57

C. Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of
Constitutionalism”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395, 1402.

58

G. Goodwin-Gill, “Refugees And Responsibility In The Twenty-First Century: More
Lessons Learned From The South Pacific“ (2003) 12 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal
23, 30.
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of grave abuses of power by liberal democratic governments is too long to
recount.”59
We argue that such categorical statements reveal a lack of awareness about
the history of deference by the judiciary in times of emergency; and a
certain naïve expectation that the executive and the judiciary stand in
opposition to each other with the judiciary displaying its true role as the
guardian of individual human rights.
Even Aradau and van Munster’s otherwise excellent insights exclude the
judicial branch of government. They contrast administrative (executive)
decision making seeking to eliminate all risk with “careful” juridical
decision.60 They refer to the turn of precaution deployed by “managers of
unease”, i.e., the executive government. One of their examples is Tony
Blair’s explanation for reaching the decision to intervene in Iraq based on
“intelligence”.61
Aradau and van Munster go even further and claim that in some instances
the logic of precaution is “impossible to accommodate by the juridical
system.” They give the example of administrative detention where the
burden of proof is on suspects, rather than on the authorities, to show that
they are innocent of criminal acts.62
59

Lord Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Blackhole”, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann
Lecture, 25 November 2003, 2. Last accessed on 26 May at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf.

60

C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 106.

61

T. Blair, (2004) Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat. Prime
Minister’s Speech, 5 March; http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp as cited
in C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 105.

62

C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 106.

16

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 05 NO. 01

We wish to take the investigation of the dispositive of risk a step further to
encompass courts as a rationality of government – through legal reasoning
– and technology of government – through the powers the courts
possess.63 We argue that the judicial system seeks to cope with the logic of
precaution in exactly the same way as the other two branches of
government. The cases we analyse indicate that precaution has become
part of legal reasoning and, more often than not, judges do not express the
view that their powers have been curtailed or that individual liberties have
been sacrificed.

C. THE JUDICIARY IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY AND THE TURN TO
PRECAUTION

For some observers the behaviour of courts since the war on terror
commenced is neither new nor surprising. A number of legal scholars,
analysing the role of courts from the American Civil War through to the
post 9/11 era argue that “when faced with national crises, the judiciary
tends to “go [] to war”64 and the “history of the judiciary in times of
emergency and alleged emergency is a dismal one of judges deferring to
executive claims.”65
63

We are not concerned with the distinction between “bio-powers” and the “juridical
system of the law” as explained by F. Ewald, “Norms, Discipline and the Law,” (1990)
30 Representations 138-161, 139. Juridical here refers to the power of courts.

64

O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional”, (2003) 112, Yale Law Journal 1011, 1034. See also M. Tushnet,
“Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, (2003) Wisconsin
Law Review 273. Cf. D. Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis”, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2565.

65

D. Dyzenhaus and R. Thwaites, “Legality and Emergency – The Judiciary in a Time of
Terror” in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War
on Terror, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 9-27, at 9. See also D. Bonner,
“Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process and
Human Rights”, (2006) 12(1) European Public Law 45.
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Oren Gross states that “when grave national crises are upon us, democratic
nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of human rights
and civil liberties, indeed of basis and fundamental legal principles is
concerned.”66 But he then goes on to propose an Extra-Legal Measures
model in times of emergency allowing the executive to “deviate from
existing legal principles, rules, and norms.”67
In such times courts side with the executive and choose survival. The US
and UK engaged in mass internment during the two World Wars and
courts sanctioned it.68
In the extra-judicial speech about Guantanamo Bay mentioned earlier Lord
Steyn referred to a case where the House of Lords upheld the validity of a
law under which a foreign national was interned in the UK during the
Second World War:69
Too often courts of law have denied the writ of the rule of law with
only the most perfunctory examination. In the context of a war on
terrorism without any end in prospect this is a sombre scene for
human rights. But there is the caution that unchecked abuse of
power begets ever greater abuse of power. And judges do have the

66

O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional”, (2003) 112, Yale Law Journal 1011, 1132.

67

Ibid., 1111.

68

M. Stibbe, “The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World
War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, (2006) 41
Journal of Contemporary History 5. See also D. Bonner, “Checking the Executive?
Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process and Human Rights”, (2006) 12(1)
European Public Law 45.

69

Lord Steyn, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary of the House of Lords, “Guantanamo Bay: The
Legal Blackhole”, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture (25 November 2003), 2. Last
accessed on 26 May at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf. The
case was Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] AC 206.
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duty, even in times of crisis, to guard against an unprincipled and
exorbitant executive response.
Preventative justice is evident not only in relation to anti-terrorism laws
but also, for example, for the detention of dangerous offenders who may
commit further offences if released.70 Seen from this perspective, Beck’s
risk society theory does not have much to offer. One can analyse new
terrorism laws as an extension of existing criminal laws to the new
circumstances of terrorism, rather than a recent invention to cope with
unprecedented catastrophic “bads” in risk society. For some time now
there has been a general move towards prevention, precaution, preclusion,
pre-emption or predetection from criminal law and immigration through to
business and dieting. Court sanctioned preventative measures in various
countries precede the war on terror.
A Foucauldian analysis is somewhat more insightful than a risk society
approach. Robert Castel wrote as early as 1991 that:71
These preventative policies thus promote a new mode of
surveillance: that of systematic predetection. This is a form of
surveillance in the sense that the intended objective is that of
anticipating and preventing the emergence of some undesirable
event: illness, abnormality, deviant behaviour, etc. (italics in the
original)
One can go much further back in time. The German Criminal Code
introduced preventive detention for dangerous criminals in 193372 and
these provisions continue to be in use. Several other European states have

70

See Section, at 2.1.

71

R. Castel, “From dangerousness to risk” ” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1991, 281-298, 288.
72

See the European Court of Human Rights decision as to admissibility in M v Germany,
1 July 2008, Application no. 19359/04. At para 41.
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legislation allowing for the preventive detention of offenders of sound
mind.73
We argue that in some respects the war on terror is no more than the latest
example of judges not protecting individuals against an unprincipled
executive. Curiously, in a UK House of Lords case decided in October
2001 – Rehman – the same Lord Steyn thought it self evident that in
matters of national security courts must be deferential and give great
weight to the views of the government.74 Lord Hoffmann held that
whether or not something was “in the interests of national security” was a
matter of judgment and policy and thus a matter for the executive, not for
the judiciary, to determine.75
The House of Lords in Rehman had reached its decision prior to 11
September 2001, but the reasons were not published until October 2001.
Some law lords added a postscript in this intervening period, underlining
how deferential courts should be to the other two branches of
government:76
[S]uch decisions [relating to terrorism], with serious potential
results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the
community through the democratic process.
For Lord Slynn, the executive “is entitled to have regard to the
precautionary and preventative principles” based on “material on which

73

Austria, Italy, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Slovakia and Switzerland. See the European
Court of Human Rights decision as to admissibility in M v Germany, 1 July 2008,
Application no. 19359/04. At para. 67.

74

Ibid., Lord Steyn, [31].

75

Section 15(3) Immigration Act 1971. Rehman v Home Secretary [2001] UKHL 47,
[50].

76

Ibid., Lord Hoffmann, [62].
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proportionately and reasonably [the executive] can conclude that there is a
real possibility” of some harmful future acts.77
According to Lord Steyn, in the context of the war on terrorism, and the
relevant legislation, the appropriate standard of proof was that the person
concerned may be (rather than more likely than not to be) a real threat to
national security.78 Lord Hoffmann observed that “the whole concept of a
standard of proof is not particularly helpful”.79
In the more recent case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed
similar views, i.e., that courts should be deferential. Judicial review, the
Court said, should only succeed where the Minister’s decision was
patently unreasonable.80 In addition, the Court did not take issue with the
decision of Parliament to set a low standard of proof.81
Apart from the less than glorious history of the judiciary in times of crisis,
we make a second criticism of observers who expect the courts to stand up
for the rights of the individual. Constructing a simple opposition between
the executive and judicial branch misses the point that the judiciary is part
of government, that opposition “assumes law and force to be opposite and
disregards the important implications of what Jacques Derrida calls the
‘force of law’”.82 As Louise Amoore argues, within the logic of risk “it is

77

Ibid., Lord Slynn, [22].
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Ibid., Lord Steyn, [29].
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Ibid., Lord Hoffman, [56].
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Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [32]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 25.
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The threat of danger to national security must be serious, meaning that “it must be
grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the
threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible” Ibid., 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII),
[90]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 51.

82

M. de Goede, “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008)
14(1) European Journal of International Relations 161, 179.
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not the case that “law recedes” as risk advances, but rather that law itself
authorizes a specific and particular mode of risk management.”83
The flurry of legislative and executive activity since 9/11 terrorism can be
seen as the latest, and not unexpected, extension of existing criminal laws.
Aims such as keeping dangerous criminals in prison, keeping immigrants,
alleged terrorists or sex offenders “under control” have become a
rationality of government in the manner in which members of the
judiciary decide cases. Simultaneously, judicial decision making – such as
the imposition of preventive detention or control orders – is a technology
of government. It is one more step along the way of pre-emption,
prevention or preclusion. In Section 2.1 of this article we look at
preventative laws in various legal contexts in Australia, Canada and the
UK.
Courts often emphasise that in exercising their power they have to balance
competing interests such as the interest of the state (sometimes its
survival) or of the majority against an individual’s human rights.84 Some
of the cases reviewed in Section 2 show that the judiciary does not reason
in terms of a simple dichotomy – individual human rights versus state
power. Instead, they refer to the human rights discourse but, ultimately,
often arrive at an outcome where individual human rights are curtailed.
There is a related problem, namely, the development of human rights law
is lagging behind some of the more novel aspects of “preventative justice”
eg, various means of restricting freedom of movement that do not amount
to deprivation of liberty or non-punitive detention at after a person has
served his sentence. We consider some of these issues under the heading
human rights and precaution in Section 2.2.
83

L. Amoore, “Risk Before Justice: When the Law Contests its own Suspension”, (2008)
21(4) Leiden Journal of International Law, 847-861, 850.

84

The US Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Rehnquist said that in a “civilized society the
most important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and order. In
wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor
of order – in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being”. W. H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime,
1998, New York: Random House, 222-3 as cited in O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional”, (2003) 112, Yale Law Journal
1011, 1020-1021.
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The turn to precaution and the perception of vulnerability affect the way in
which governments and courts analyse global threats. The fight against
terrorism – unknown unknowns – creates one more paradox. In traditional
wars sovereign states fight against each other. In the global war on terror
sovereign states seek to survive by taking global measures (eg passing of
similar anti-terrorist laws or participating in a UN resolution). At the same
time the threat, perceived or real, comes from non-state actors thus
creating the need for states to take preventive measures of unknown
efficacy against unknown for an unknown length of time. But the
individuals who represent the global enemy are not unknown, or at least
not unknowable. The enemy is the Muslim convert who happened to be in
Afghanistan in 2001, the Muslim man who is in the UK and apparently
wants to go to Iraq against Coalition troops; the Moroccan man who
cannot give a satisfactory explanation for his trips from Canada. We return
to these issues, the sovereignty-globalisation tension in the context of
precaution, in the last part of Section 2, 2.3 entitled Sovereignty v global
threats and solutions.

II. PREVENTATIVE JUSTICE
As pointed out in Section 1, some varieties of preventative justice have
been around for a long time. In this section, we claim that the reach of the
recent legislation is unprecedented and yet the judiciary has upheld the
validity of these radical new laws. The cases we analyse relate to “control
order” laws in Australia and the UK and certificates of inadmissibility
(coupled with detention) in Canada.
After 9/11 the UK and then the Australian Parliament passed “control
order” legislation. It allows the executive (in the UK) or the judiciary (in
Australia) to impose obligations such as staying inside one’s house for 12
hours a day or more, prohibitions on the use of communication devices, a
requirement to wear a tracking device and to report at specified times and
places and so on.85 In Canada, a person can be declared “inadmissible” by
85

For the Australian legislation see Criminal Code 1995, Div 104, Section 104.5(3). For
the UK legislation see Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. In Home Secretary v JJ [2007]
UKHL 45 the obligations included remaining within one’s house/apartment for 18 hours
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the executive government86 on, inter alia, security grounds, i.e., for being
engaged in terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, engaging
in violence that might endanger the lives or safety of people in Canada, or
being a member of a certain type of organisation.87 If the person is already
in Canada (as opposed to a person trying to enter Canada), they can be
detained and then deported. At an initial review, and periodic reviews
thereafter,88 a court may release a person89 but impose conditions very
similar to a “control order”.90
It is not the aim of this article to judge whether such anticipatory measures
achieve the results governments claim they seek to achieve, but we argue
that preventive detention of serious convicted criminals, or refusing a
crime suspect bail, is significantly different to the detention pursuant to
this new variety of criminal preventive detention: the preventive measures
a day. When allowed out, between 10am to 4pm, the controlled persons were confined
within an area not bigger than 72 km2.
86

Two Ministers must sign the certificate. Section 77 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act 2002.
Security certificates have existed as a part of Canadian law since the 1990s. As of early
2007 a total of about twenty-seven (five after 11 September 2001) such certificates, had
been issued. See J. Ip, “Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist
Suspects”, (2007) 16 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 773, 802.

87

An organization that there are reasonable grounds for believing has engaged, engages,
or will engage in terrorist acts.

88

Before the Supreme Court decision the detention of foreign nationals, ie, non
permanent residents was mandatory upon the issuing of the inadmissibility certificate and
a separate order was not necessary. The detention of foreign nationals was not reviewed
within 48 hours.

89

Sections 77(1) and 80 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002. There is a
very large number of court cases brought by Mr Charkaoui, but it appears that the
reasonableness of the security certificate has not been determined by a court. In the 2005
case on detention the Court makes mention of the fact that the certificate has not been
confirmed. Re Charkaoui (2005) FC 248, Noël J, [3].

90

Section 84 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002.
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are against someone who has not committed a crime (or there is not
enough evidence to charge them) and even against people who may never
attempt to commit an offence. These laws do not go together with laws
aimed at punishing. They are entirely targeted towards preventing
something from occurring in the future; these laws deploy radical
precaution.

A. AUSTRALIA
In relation to criminal laws, in 2004 the High Court of Australia declared
valid legislation allowing the detention of a sex offender who has served
his or her sentence, but poses a risk of future offending.91 Both the
detention of a convicted sex offender after the end of his or her sentence
and the Criminal Code “control orders” are directed towards the future. A
sex offender can only be kept in detention pursuant to “cogent evidence”
and “to a high degree of probability” that they constitute an unacceptable
risk92 having regard to psychiatric and other evidence.93 In addition, they
have already been convicted of serious offences by a court satisfied of
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
By contrast, the post 9/11 criminal legislation is almost entirely based on
the precautionary principle, on the One Per Cent doctrine. To impose a
control order the “issuing court” has to be satisfied only on the balance of
probabilities that making it would substantially assist in preventing a
terrorist act; or the person has provided training to, or received training
from, a listed terrorist organisation; and the measures imposed (curfew,

91

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33. Per Gleeson CJ, 206-207;
[18]; per Gummow and Crennan JJ, 222, 229-230; [79], [114]-[121]; per Callinan J, 356357; [595]-[600]. In Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 the High
Court of Australia upheld the validity of legislation detaining sex offenders considered to
be an “unacceptable risk”.

92

Section 13(3)(a) and (b), Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld).

93

Section 13(4), Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld).
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reporting conditions, etc) are reasonably necessary, and appropriate and
adapted to protect the public from a terrorist act.94
The relevant law was challenged in the case of Thomas v Mowbray.95 The
case is unusual because the legislation in question provided that the court,
not the executive, imposes the control orders.96 An “issuing court” had
found97 that because of Mr Thomas’s association with Al-Qaida, he was
“an available resource that can be tapped into” to commit terrorism
offences. He was, according to the court, vulnerable and possibly
susceptible to the views of extremists.98 The Court was therefore satisfied
on the balance of probabilities that the measures imposed would serve the
purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act. The 2006 control
order imposed on Thomas included, inter alia, a condition that he not
contact Osama bin Laden.99
Mr Thomas argued in the High Court of Australia that the imposition of
the order by the judiciary breached the separation of powers doctrine.100
He argued further that the “issuing court” would have to exercise powers
antithetical to the judicial function, i.e., it would have to make various
predictions and conjectures instead of adjudicating on his guilt for past

94

Criminal Code 1995, Div 104, Section 104.4(c) and (d).

95

(2007) 237 ALR 194 ; [2007] HCA 33.

96

The Court referred to Mr Thomas’ argument that the legislation is invalid because it
confers non-judicial power on courts as “curious”. Ibid., Callinan J, 355; [592].

97

On the basis of the same evidence which in the criminal proceedings was held to have
been improperly obtained.

98

Jabbour v Thomas [2006] FMCA 1286 (27 August 2006).

99

T. Allard, “Jihad Jack Wife Terror Link”, Sydney Morning Herald (29 August 2006).
Last accessed on 8 July 2008 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/jihad-jack-wifesterror-link/2006/08/28/1156617275236.html
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Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33. Per Gleeson CJ, 205; [15].
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acts. A majority of the Court rejected both of Mr Thomas’ lines of
argument.101
Chief Justice Gleeson, for example, found a reference to the concept of
“preventive justice” dating back to the 18th century. The concept was
discussed by the famous 18th century jurist Blackstone:102
This preventive justice consists in obliging those persons, whom
there is probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to
stipulate with and to give full assurance to the public, that such
offence as is apprehended shall not happen…
In dismissing the argument that only criminal convictions should impose
control order type restrictions, the majority justices drew various analogies
with judicial orders where deprivation of liberty or other restraints are not
incidental to the adjudication and punishing of criminal guilt for past
behaviour such as an order for the continued detention of a sex offender,
as discussed above.
However, control orders are different in several key aspects. As Kirby J in
his dissent in Thomas concluded, a person may be made subject to a
control order:103
[N]ot by reference to past conduct or even by reference to what
that person himself might or might not do in the future. It is based
entirely on a prediction of what is “reasonably necessary, and
reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting
the public from a terrorist act”, a vague, obscure and indeterminate
101

Kirby and Hayne JJ dissented.

102

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1769), Bk IV at 248 as cited in
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33, per Gleeson CJ, 205; [16].
See also per Gummow and Crennan JJ, 219-220; [73]-[77]; per Callinan J, 291-292;
[591]-[600].
103

Ibid., Kirby J, 291-292; [354]. His view that the law may lead to “the loss of liberty,
potentially extending to virtual house arrest” was not shared by the majority. Hayne J,
328; [499], said the issuing court will have to engage in “prognostication”.
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criterion if ever there was one. [...] This invites the question: if the
community of nations, with all of its powers and resources, cannot
agree on what precisely “terrorism” is (and how it can be
prevented), how can one expect a […] court in Australia to decide
with consistency and in a principled (judicial) way what is
reasonably necessary to protect the public from a terrorist act?
Kirby J and the other dissenting justice, Hayne J, in separate reasons held
that there was no ascertainable test or standard on the basis of which a
court could decide whether to grant or refuse to make an order.104 The task
that a court would perform was so indeterminate that it was not the
exercise of judicial power.105 It was not appropriate for the judiciary to
“consider future consequences the occurrence of which depends upon
work done by police and intelligence services that is not known and
cannot be known or predicted by the court.”106 Decision making would
necessitate “evaluative judgments”, or the court’s “own idiosyncratic
notion as to what is just”,107 in relation to “diffuse, fragmentary and even
conflicting pieces of intelligence”, which should be done by the
executive.108 It is “quintessentially” for the legislative and executive
branches, not the judiciary, to decide how to protect the public for
terrorism.109
There was thus an implication even in the minority judgments, especially
that of Justice Hayne, that it is reasonable for such a power to be exercised
by the executive. With respect, whether a court or the executive exercises

104

Ibid., per Hayne J 321; [468]; per Kirby J, 281-282; [321]-[322].

105

Ibid., per Hayne J 327; [495].
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Ibid., per Hayne J 323-324; [476].
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Ibid., per Hayne J 332; [516].
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Ibid., per Hayne J 330-331; [510].
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Ibid., per Hayne J 329; [504]; per Kirby J, 280; [317].
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this type of power, it appears to be an instance of “decisionism”, or the
application of the One Per Cent doctrine, by its very nature: 110
[W]hen evidence is uncertain, the responsibility of the ‘suspected
terrorist’ is a matter of decision. This decision is no longer the
juridical decision for which careful consideration of evidence is
necessary, but becomes an administrative decision, where the rule
of zero risk takes precedence.
Dyzenhaus and Thwaites criticise the minority justices for “exhibit[ing] an
anachronistic attitude to the administrative state and to give up on the hope
of having the rule of law control the war on terror”,111 although exactly
how the court was supposed to “control the war on terror” was left
unclear. As the same authors say, it might be that “preventative measures
can never sufficiently conform to the rule of law to make them a legitimate
measure for a constitutional state to adopt.”112
The control order regime does not allow for deprivation of liberty as such.
The majority in Thomas113 stated that detention (eg under the sex
offenders legislation) “differs significantly in degree and quality from
what may be entailed by observance of an interim control order”.114 But in
his analysis of the Thomas decision Justin Gleeson has argued that the
judiciary would probably uphold the validity of a (hypothetical) law
110

C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International
Relations 89, 106.
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D. Dyzenhaus and R. Thwaites, “Legality and Emergency – The Judiciary in a Time
of Terror” in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the
War on Terror, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 9-27, 24.
112

Ibid., 18.
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As mentioned above, footnote 103, in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194;
[2007] HCA 33, Kirby J, 291-292; [354], considered that a control order may amount to
deprivation of liberty in some circumstances.
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Ibid., Gummow and Crennan JJ, 229; [116]. Cf J. Renwick, “Counter Terrorism and
Australian Law” (2007) 3(3) Security Challenges 67, 73.
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authorising the detention/imprisonment of a person upon proof that he or
she is a member of a proscribed organisation as long as the court forms a
view that imprisonment is necessary to protect the public.115

B. CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld preventive, criminal detention
legislation relating to convicted dangerous offenders as far back as 1987,
but remarked that detention for the sole purpose of preventing the
commission of a future offence would violate the Charter.116 In 2007 in the
case of Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)117 the
Supreme Court “adapted” the purpose of the legislation to the migration
law context and concluded that the periodic review of the detention by a
court meant that the law in question did not contravene the Charter as the
review meant that detention was not indefinite.118 The Supreme Court
added that “foreign nationals can apply for release and depart from Canada
at any time.”119 The Court found that there was a rational foundation for
the detention of foreign, namely, the signing of a certificate that he or she
was a danger.120
In Charkaou a Canadian permanent resident and another person, a
“foreign national”, argued that the law breached certain provisions of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
115

J. Gleeson, “Thomas v Mowbray”, Paper presented at ANU 12th annual public law
weekend, 11 November 2007. Last accessed on 1 May 2008 at
http://www.banco.net.au/pdf/j-g_articles/ThomasEvMowbrayPaper11_11.pdf, 16-17.
116

R. v Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, per LaForest J, 327-28.
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Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Charkaoui) 2007 SCC 9; [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350.
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Ibid., [107] and [127]; 408 and 415.

119

Ibid., [90]; 401-402.
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Ibid., [89]; 401..
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The case is another excellent example of the logic of precaution in action.
The matter went through several courts before reaching the Supreme
Court. Some of the courts emphasised the need to employ the
precautionary approach in national security matters:121
Situations and entities that pose a threat to national security are
often difficult to detect and are designed to strike where society is
most vulnerable. Attacks against national security can have tragic
consequences. People who pose a danger to national security are
[...] difficult to identify and their borderless networks are often
difficult to infiltrate. They strike when least expected. Where
national security is involved, we must do everything possible to
avert catastrophe. The emphasis must be on prevention. After all,
the security of the state and the public are at stake. Once certain
acts are perpetrated, it could be too late.
In 2003 Mr Charkaoui found himself detained after the executive issued an
“inadmissibility” certificate and the Federal Court agreed that Mr
Charkaoui continued to be a danger to Canada’s national security. The
Federal Court said that the executive “linked” Mr Charkaoui to
violence.122 The “link” was that Mr Charkaoui was a karate enthusiast:
In the past, it has been observed that some individuals involved
with Al-Qaeda are devoted to the practice of karate and/or the
martial arts. In particular Ziard Jarrah, who was part of the group
that hijacked American Airlines Flight 93, had trained in the
martial arts in preparation for the September 11, 2001 operation.
The Federal Court seemed to accept the logic of the executive, even
though an interest in karate in itself is not proof of anything; this fact
acquired a certain significance when taken together with other facts eg the
fact that Mr Charkaoui is a Muslim and from Morocco, rather than, for
example a Zen Buddhist from Japan.
121

Charkaoui 2003 FC 1419 (CanLII), [126].
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Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [50]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 548-9.

2009]

“RISK SOCIETY”

31

This is an example of the “prosaic” or “banal face of pre-emption” based
on everyday activities or interests.123 The Court applied the logic of radical
precaution further. The lack of evidence that Mr Charkaoui plans to
commit a crime turns into sinister evidence that he is a “sleeper agent”.
The Court accepted that the executive “expressly and unequivocally
associate[d] the [Mr Charkaoui] with a sleeper agent in the bin Laden
network”124 despite the total lack of positive evidence of such
“membership” or “association”.125
In a subsequent hearing in 2004 the Court had “difficulty seeing any
conceivable conditions that might neutralize this serious danger“,
whatever the danger might be.126 Somehow, the onus was on Mr
Charkaoui to present evidence “that might allow [the Court] an
understanding of this danger“ and since Mr Charkaoui failed to do so the
Court could not see how the danger could be “alleviated or neutralized.”127
In 2005, after the fourth detention review, Mr Charkaoui was released
from detention,128. The Court imposed severe restrictions on Mr
Charkaoui’s freedom of movement, equivalent to control orders in
Australia and the UK,129 to ensure that the “neutrality” of the danger
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L. Amoore and M. de Goede, “Transactions after 9/11: the banal face of the
preemptive strike” (2008) 33(2) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 173185, 174.
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Re Charkaoui 2005 FC 248 (CanLII), [1]; (2005), 3 F.C.R. 389, 394-5.
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Curfew for 11 ½ hours a day, and at other times Mr Charkaoui had to be accompanied,
wear an electronic tag; could not use of communication devices, etc. Ibid.,[86]; 422-23.
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continued.130 The “danger” had somehow inexplicably not only decreased,
it had been neutralized.131

C. UK
The UK control order legislation purports to be in accordance with the
Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence
makes it clear that Art 5 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to
liberty and security of the person, does not permit preventative deprivation
of liberty, not even to prevent the commission of a terrorist act.132
However, preventative restrictions on the freedom of movement may not
contravene Art 5 of the ECHR, where they do not amount to deprivation
of liberty. In Labita, restrictions were imposed on a person considered
“dangerous” because suspected (“on the basis of inferences, full proof
being required only to secure a conviction”)133 of being a member of the
Mafia. The ECtHR agreed with the Italian court: 134
[I]t is legitimate for preventive measures, including special
supervision, to be taken against persons suspected of being
members of the Mafia, even prior to conviction, as they are
intended to prevent crimes being committed. Furthermore, an
acquittal does not necessarily deprive such measures of all
foundation, as concrete evidence gathered at trial, though
insufficient to secure a conviction, may nonetheless justify
130

Ibid., [83]; 422.

131

Ibid.,[75]; 420.

132

See Art 5(1)(b) and Engel v Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A, No 22
(1979-80) 1 EHRR 647, [69].
133

Labita v Italy, judgment of 6 April 2000, application No. 26772/95, [65].

134

Ibid., [195].
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reasonable fears that the person concerned may in the future
commit criminal offences.
As long as the restrictions are not severe enough to amount to deprivation
of liberty, they are permissible.135
Under the post 9/11 UK legislation the Home Secretary (the executive)
can make a control order if he or she has reasonable grounds for
suspecting that an individual is involved in terrorism-related activity, and
consider that it is necessary to make a control order imposing obligations
on that individual in order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.136
This is subject to judicial review.137
The argument that control orders constitute “deprivation of liberty”,
contrary to Art 5 of the ECHR was argued in Home Secretary v JJ, Home
Secretary v MB and Home Secretary v E.138
In Home Secretary v JJ139 the House of Lords followed the jurisprudence
of the ECHR with respect to what constitutes deprivation of liberty: there
is no bright line, only a difference of degree and intensity, between
deprivation of liberty and restriction or control which would not engage
Art 5(1).140 In deciding on which side of the line a control order falls, a
court takes account of matters such as the type, duration, effects and
manner of implementation of the measure in question. Each case depends
135

Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention guarantees freedom of movement. The
control orders may be in breach of this provision but the UK is not a party to the Protocol.
136

Section 2(1).

137

Sections 3(2), (10) and (11).

138

Home Secretary v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46;
Home Secretary v E [2007] UKHL 47.
139

140

[2007] UKHL 45.

Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention guarantees freedom of movement. The UK is
not a party to the Protocol.
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on its own facts.141 A majority of the House of Lords found that the
measures (including an 18-hour “curfew”) clearly amounted to deprivation
of liberty.
However, in Home Secretary v MB142 the House of Lords held that
restrictions, which included a 14 hour curfew and confinement within a 23
km2 area the rest of the time, did not breach Art 5.143 In the words of
Louise Amoore, borrowing from Foucault “the individual already
resembles the crime before he has committed it”. The courts deploy a
“calculative practice” “before a crime takes place, in order to see or to
envisage the individual as criminal.”144 Louise Amoore refers to the “legal
screen” that is, the law’s “intrinsic role in determining ‘the way in which
we see and are given to the world to be seen’ … If the legal screen is
interposed between the world of data, facts, and evidence and the making
of social, political and legal judgements and decisions, then pre-emptive
evidence may itself be authenticated.”145
141

The classical “borderline” case is Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980,
Series A, No.39 (1981) 3 EHRR 533. The Italian government kept Mr Guzzardi on a
small island while criminal proceedings against him were ongoing. On the facts of the
case the ECHR said that the cumulative effect of all the restrictions imposed on Mr
Guzzardi amounted to deprivation of liberty. The restrictions were containment for 16
months within a very small area on an island, with a nine-hour overnight curfew in
dilapidated accommodation, without social contact, subject to strict supervision with
obligations to report to the authorities twice daily, to inform them of anyone whom he
wished to telephone, and to seek permission before visiting the mainland. On the other
hand, house arrest for 12 hours each weekday and the whole weekend was held to be
restriction on movement (Trijonis v. Lithuania, judgment of 17 March 2005, application
No. 23333/02), as was a ten-hour curfew with a requirement not to leave home without
telling the police (Raimondo v Italy, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A, No.281-A
(1994) 18 EHRR 237).
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[2007] UKHL 46; [2007] 3 W.L.R. 681.
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L. Amoore, “Vigilant Visualities: The Watchful Politics of the War on Terror”, (2007)
38 Security Dialogue 215, 221.
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21(4) Leiden Journal of International Law, 847-861, 857.
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRECAUTION
In this section our interest is twofold: Firstly, on the tendency of
governments, and the courts, to curtail civil liberties in times of
emergency. Secondly, on the inability of the human rights discourse to
keep up with the discourse of risk society and precaution. The protection
of human rights and the deployment of precautionary measures are
dissociated, thus enabling courts to deploy precautionary measures while
ostensibly not breaching human rights.

I. AUSTRALIA
Prima facie, compared to the Canadian and UK cases analysed further
below, Haneef a 2007 case, appears a rare example of a case where the
human rights discourse seemed to be well equipped to deal with the
exigency of the ‘war on terror’. Dr Haneef’s visa was cancelled by
Australia’s executive government146 after cousins of his were arrested and
charged in relation to terrorism offences in the UK. He himself was
arrested in Australia147 and charged with having intentionally provided
resources – a mobile phone SIM card – to a terrorist organisation.148
The cancellation was on the basis that the Minister for Immigration
reasonably suspected that Dr Haneef did not pass the “character test”.149
146

MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [15]-[17]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 418.

147

Ibid., [7]-[8], [10]; 416-7.

Section 102.7 of the Criminal Code (Cth), the same Code under which a court imposed a
control order on Mr. Thomas. See Chapter 2, 2.1.
148

149

MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [13]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 417.

Section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (reproduced in Annex B). The
“character test” allows the Minister to refuse or cancel a visa where a person has, for
example, committed a serious crime and therefore does not “pass the character test”.
Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [101]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 59.
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The Federal Court found in Dr Haneef’s favour as did the Full Bench of
the Federal Court.150
These two cases are remarkable and ordinary at the same time. They are
notable for their discussion of the importance of the judicial branch of
government (especially the first instance decision) and fundamental rights
(especially the appeal decision) and for the fact that they reinstated Dr
Haneef’s visa. The expression “rule of law” appears more than 20 times.
Expressions such as “the war on terror” or “fight against terrorism” do not
appear at all. The courts’ legal reasons are measured and formulated in a
way that makes the political context fade in the background. Their
apparent ordinariness makes them remarkable.
The first instance decision starts with a long and vigorous defence of the
Federal Court’s jurisdiction and power.151 His Honour speaks of the rule
of law152 and the “embedded constitutional guarantee that persons will be
dealt with according to law”.153 The judiciary has an important role to play
and “each of the arms of government [including the executive] must pay
due deference to, and not to intrude upon, the roles of the other arms of
government.”154 The executive’s heavy responsibility in national security
matters,155 the Minister’s accountability to Parliament or the government’s
accountability to the electorate cannot give the Minister the right to act
outside of his powers.156
150

MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203; (2007) 163 FCR 414.

151

Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [5]-[68]; 161 FCR 40, 43-53. Dr Haneef’s right of
judicial review was not in doubt and there was no obvious legal reason to explain or
defend the Court’s role.
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Ibid., [9]; 44.
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Ibid.,[19]; 45.
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Ibid., [31]; 47.
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Ibid., [68]; 53.
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On appeal, the Full Bench of Federal Court referred to the principles that
Acts should be construed, where possible, so as not to infringe on common
law rights and freedoms.157 The Court remarked that Dr Haneef had
valuable rights in Australia.158
The Court at first instance denied that this was “a bout between a section
of the judiciary and the executive”, but referred to an extra-judicial speech
by Lord Bingham in which he spoke of “an inevitable” and “entirely
proper tension” between the executive and the judiciary, especially “at
times of perceived threats to national security” and the judiciary’s duty “to
require that [the executive] go no further must be performed if the rule of
law is to be observed.”159
The Court held that the Minister had misconstrued the expression “an
association with”160 that it should not “construe words widely to allow
them to apply to persons of good character when a narrower construction
which would exclude such persons is open.”161 The Full Court agreed and
held that the legislation should be construed narrowly to exclude persons
who have innocent associations.162
157

MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [107]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 442-43.
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Ibid., [110]; 443.
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Lord Bingham, ???????????????????, 28 as cited in Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273,
[58]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 52.
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Spender J said the case was about the construction of the provision that “a person does
not pass the character test if: ... the person has or has had an association with someone
else, or with a group or organisation, whom the Minister reasonably suspects has been or
is involved in criminal conduct.”
This explanatory statement is not part of the reported decision and has no numbered
paragraphs; it is only available on the online version.
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Writing in the context of Canadian legislation Craig Forcese says:163
At core, however, the fundamental pre-requisite to […] limiting
interpretation is meaningful access to courts willing to probe
carefully government claims of national security. The rules of
statutory interpretation do not prescribe mechanical outcomes.
Is this a rare example of the judiciary keeping the executive in check?
Arguably, yes, within the limited scope of what a court can do in judicial
review proceeding. As Vivienne Jabri puts it, the judiciary is part of the
“grammar” of the legislation and “the locations in which such articulations
of dissent from sovereign power take place are severely limited”.164 Both
Courts accepted that on the available evidence and applying the correct
legal test the Minister could have reached the same conclusion and could
probably make the same decision, while within his power, in the future.165
Furthermore, without wishing to sound too cynical, we may also observe
that Dr Haneef faced no criminal charges and it became clear very quickly
that he had no more than an innocent association (being a cousin) of
people involved in terrorist plots. Therefore, there was also no room for
precaution or prevention: it was obvious that Dr Haneef presented no risk
to anybody.

163

C. Forcese, “Through a Glass Darkly: The Role and Review of “National Security”
Concepts in Canadian Law”, (2006) 43 Alberta Law Review 963, 981.
164

V. Jabri, “The Limits of Agency in Times of Emergency” in J. Huysmans, A. Dobson
and R. Prokhovnik (eds.) The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political
Agency, New York: Routledge, 2006, 136, 147.
165

Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [261]-[264]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 86. MIAC v
Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [133]-[135]; (2007) 163 FCR 414 448-49.
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B. CANADA
In Charkaoui, discussed above, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasised
that “in a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably
and in conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it
guarantees.”166 The Supreme Court held that the use of evidence not
disclosed to the certified person, without a counter-balancing mechanism
(the Court recommended the introduction of a special advocate)167 was a
violation of s7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, the
guarantee of fundamental justice.168 Mr Charkaoui’s co-appellant argued
successfully that the Court held that the law should apply equally to
“foreign nationals” like him and “permanent residents” like Mr
Charkaoui.169
Was this a victory for human right and the rule of law against an
overreaching executive, a sign of “an attitude of scepticism” towards
certain policies in the war on terrorism?170
Not necessarily. Procedural changes to the law were found to be sufficient
to make it comply with the Canadian Charter. The Court rejected all the
other human rights arguments raised by Mr Charkaoui and his coappellant. For example, it held that extended periods of detention do not

166

Charkaoui 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [1]; 1 S.C.R. 350, 362-63.

167

Ibid., [70]-[87]; 392-400.

168

By contrast, the Federal Court at first instance had strongly defended the legislation
and asked rhetorically: “Are more appropriate procedures truly conceivable?”: Charkaoui
2003 FC 1419 (CanLII), [119].
169

A foreign national’s, as opposed to a permanent residents such as certificate was not
reviewable for 120 days after a judge confirms its reasonableness. Sections 82(2) and
84(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002.
170

T. Poole, “Recent Developments in the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Canada”, (2007) 7(3)
Human Rights Law Review 633, 633.
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breach the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment171 or a common
law (rule of law) prohibition on detention on the basis of an executive
decision.172 It held that judges reviewing orders were non-deferential and
are not perceived to be “in the camp” of the executive.173
Further, one of the lower courts expressly criticised Mr Charkaoui for
claiming that his individual human rights were absolute:174
The individual right to liberty [...] no longer has much meaning or
scope when, collectively, the society charged with ensuring its
protection has lost its own right to liberty and security as a result of
terrorist activities that it was powerless to prevent or eradicate
owing to this individual right that it was to protect and intended to
protect. The choice […] “is not between order and liberty. It is
between liberty with order and anarchy without either.”
Similarly, in Suresh, a 2002 Supreme Court of Canada decision, it was
held that deportation to torture may be justified in some circumstances
where a person is a danger to national security, even though the Court
underlined the importance of ensuring that175
legal tools do not undermine values that are fundamental to our
democratic society -- liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of
fundamental justice --values that lie at the heart of the Canadian
constitutional order and the international instruments that Canada
has signed. In the end, it would be a Pyrrhic victory if terrorism

171

Section 12 of the Charter. Re Charkaoui 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [95]-[117]; 1 S.C.R.
350, 403-12.
172

Ibid., [137]; 418.
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Ibid., [42]; 379.
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Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [4]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 13.
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were defeated at the cost of sacrificing our commitment to those
values.
The Federal Court of Appeal (the Court below the Supreme Court) held
that deportation, even to torture, was a proportionate response to the
pressing objective of preventing Canada from becoming a haven for
terrorism. Expelling Mr Suresh would “not shock the conscience” of most
Canadians:176
Suspected terrorists cannot lay claim to an expectation that the
Charter will protect them against refoulement simply because they
have been successful in penetrating our borders. Those who are
prepared to participate in political reform by way of terrorism
freely accept the risks which flow from this form of expression,
including death. It is not refoulement by the Canadian government
which exposes persons to the risk of torture, rather it is the pursuit
of political goals through terrorism which is the true causa
causans. Canada is neither the first nor last link in the chain of
causation giving rise to torture. The first link is the suspected
terrorist. The last link is the country of refoulement. Canada is
merely an involuntary intermediary.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the view that Canada was no more
than “an involuntary intermediary”; nonetheless it held that in
“exceptional circumstances” a person may be expelled to face torture
elsewhere.177
Michel Coutu and Marie-Hélène Giroux have argued that post 9/11 there
has been a paradigm shift from liberty to security in judicial decision
making and criticise Suresh itself for being a Pyrrhic victory.178 They
176

Suresh 2000 (CanLII) 17101, [120].
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“The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must await future
cases.” Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [78]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 46-47.
178

M. Coutu and M.-H. Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security
before the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee
Law 313, 313-14 and 323 respectively.
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compare Suresh with the case of Burns179 decided only about a year
earlier, an extradition case in which a crime suspect could have faced the
death penalty in the US. The Court did not allow the extradition after
declining to treat the executive’s discretion with the “utmost
circumspection” as it had been prepared to earlier (eg, in Kindler a 1991
case).180 In Burns the Court said it was not trying to dictate foreign policy
to the executive, but had to fulfil its duty as the guardian of the
Constitution.181
One possible explanation for the difference between Suresh and Burns is
the proliferation of precautionary reasoning since 9/11. In Burns the Court
emphasised its own role as a guardian of the Constitution and individual
human rights. By contrast, in Suresh it spoke of the executive and
parliament’s duty to do what they can to combat terrorism: 182
Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal
tools to face the manifest evil of terrorism and the random and
arbitrary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in an ever widening
spiral of loss and fear.

C. UK
In Home Secretary v JJ (a case already examined above), the human rights
discourse was present but the House of Lords did not address the
underlying question of the orders’ effectiveness directly:183
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180

Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 SCR 779, per LaForest, 837.
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Control orders are highly contentious. Many think them essential
as a means of providing some protection at least against suspected
terrorists, the very minimum which government should do in
fulfilment of its undoubted obligation to safeguard public security.
Others abhor the whole notion of preventive action against people
not even to be charged with a criminal offence and question
whether the control order regime, like internment in the past, does
not create more terrorists than it disables. That, however, is a
debate for the House in its legislative capacity, not for your
Lordships in the Appellate Committee.
As mentioned in 2.1 in Home Secretary v MB,184 the controlees argued a
breach of Art 5 of the ECHR. They further argued a breach of Art 6, right
to a fair trial.185 MB succeeded at first instance before the High Court.186
The Court criticised both the low standard necessary for the order to be
made by the executive – “reasonable grounds for suspicion”,187 based on
evidence which was not disclosed to the controlee, and the low standard
necessary for the order to be confirmed by a court – that the order is not
“flawed”.188 Further, according to Sullivan J, the role of the court pursuant
to the PTA was too limited – it allowed for judicial review, whereas Art 6
of the Convention requires full merits review.189 Sullivan J concluded that
the legislation was incompatible with Art 6 of the Convention:190
184

[2007] UKHL 46.

185

The House of Lords held that the proceedings were civil, not criminal, and therefore
the more exhaustive provisions of Art 6(3) of the European Convention did not apply.
See Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46, Lord Bingham, [24]; Lord Hoffmann, [48].
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The thin veneer of legality which is sought to be applied … cannot
disguise the reality. That controlees’ rights under the Convention
are being determined not by an independent court in compliance
with Article 6.1, but by executive decision-making, untrammelled
by any prospect of effective judicial supervision.
In the House of Lords Lord Brown, for example, spoke of the right to a
fair hearing, Art 6, as “not merely an absolute right but one of altogether
too great importance to be sacrificed on the altar of terrorism control”.191
Yet in the end, rather than declare the law incompatible with the Human
Rights Act and the ECHR, the House of Lords opted for a practical
solution on a case by case basis which would achieve compliance with Art
6.192

IV. SOVEREIGNTY V GLOBAL THREATS AND
SOLUTIONS
By definition, states seek to assert their sovereignty when they feel
threatened. Whether it is the fear of immigration, war or terrorism, it
always concerns an outside threat. What is new with the war on terrorism
is that there is no conventional war as such (if one puts aside the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan), it is of indefinite duration, the rules of engagement
are unclear and the enemy appears impossible to identify. But perhaps,
once the precautionary principles come into play, the enemy can be
identified. The Muslim karate enthusiast in Canada, the white Australian
Muslim who was in Afghanistan on 9/11 and the Tamil from Sri Lanka
have nothing at all in common other than the fact that they are perceived
(or represented for everyone to see as) the potential terrorist whose control
or detention is necessary to prevent a potential disaster. Below, we explore
some of the paradoxes relating to Western states’ attempts to assert
sovereignty and how they go about identifying those who pose a threat.
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A. AUSTRALIA
The tension between sovereignty and global threats is nicely encapsulated
by the case of Thomas v Mowbray.193 The Australian Constitution contains
heads of power which limit the Federal Parliament’s legislative power. Mr
Thomas argued that neither the “defence” nor the “external affairs” power
supported the legislation in question.194
One of the most famous constitutional law cases in Australian legal
history, the Communist Party Case,195 concerned the Australian
government’s unsuccessful attempt to ban the Communist Party of
Australia.196 The Cold War was at its height, yet the High Court analysed
the legislation as if a “state of peace ostensibly existed“.197 The Court
stated further that the central purpose of the defence power in the
Constitution (“the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and
of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain
the laws of the Commonwealth“)198 was the protection of the state from
external enemies:199 “war and the possibility of war with an extraAustralian nation or organism”.200 Only the “supreme emergency of war
193

(2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33.

194
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itself“201 could have supported the law in question and thus it was declared
unconstitutional.202.
In Thomas, some 55 years later, the executive government argued that the
risks associated with terrorism meant that the law was supported by the
“defence power” (sovereignty) as well as the “external affairs” power
because terrorism affects other states as well as Australia’s relations with
other states (global threat and global fight against it).203
Six out of the seven High Court justices agreed. The proscription of
terrorist acts, they concluded, “falls within a central conception of the
defence power.”204 A majority held that the defence power was not limited
to aggression from a foreign state, but instead included non-state actors
and internal threats.205 The defence power could be invoked “while
terrorism of the kind proved here remains a threat”206 in order to support
laws “aimed at anticipating and avoiding the infliction of suffering.”207
(italics added).
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Callinan J expressly criticised the Communist Party Case and commented
that the sole dissenting judge in that case208 had probably been more
perceptive “to the gravity of direct and indirect internal threats inspired
externally, and the different manifestations of war and warfare in an
unsettled and dangerous world.”209 By contrast, the majority in that case
had, according to his Honour, shown210
both a preoccupation with the events of the recent past [the Second
World War], of a declared war, uniformed, readily distinguishable
external enemies, generally culturally, ethnically, ideologically and
religiously homogenous states, and an incomplete appreciation,
despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of the potential of weaponry for
massive harm.
In relation to the external affairs power Gummow and Crennan JJ
expressed the view that since the definition of “terrorist act” in the
Criminal Code included instances in which the object of coercion or
intimidation may be the government or public of a foreign country,
therefore the “external affairs” power supported the legislation.211 The law
208

Ibid. Chief Justice Latham would have upheld the validity of the law. In his dissenting
judgment his Honour said at 156:
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in question was with respect to matters affecting relations with other
countries.
Without explaining what justified the different contemporary
interpretation, their Honours concluded that the commission of a “terrorist
act” as defined in the law was “now, even if it has not been in the past” a
matter which could affect Australia’s relations with other nations. Since
2001 terrorism in one country has consequences for other countries,
including that “preventive or precautionary state action may be justified;
not only an immediate threat but also possible future risks must be
considered.”212

B. CANADA
In Suresh213 the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether to expel a
refugee who may be at risk of torture in his home country because he is a
“danger to the security of the country” of Canada.214
Mr Suresh, an ethnic Tamil from Sri Lanka, argued that deportation to
torture would breach the Canadian Charter of Rights215 and that the words
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“terrorism” and “danger to the security of Canada”, neither of which was
defined in the legislation, were unconstitutionally vague.216
Mr Suresh’s activities in Canada were non-violent:217 fund-raising and
“support activities” of the Tamil cause.218 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that a narrow meaning of the word “danger”, which might
have been the intended meaning in the Refugees Convention at the time it
came into force in 1951, could not be adopted after 9/11:219
Whatever the historic validity of insisting on direct proof of
specific danger to the deporting country, as matters have evolved,
we believe courts may now conclude that the support of terrorism
abroad raises a possibility of adverse repercussions on Canada’s
security.
The Court emphasised first, the existence of terrorist transport and
financial networks spanning the globe that may be used by terrorists.
Secondly, terrorist acts and their consequences are global. Terrorists may
target a place far from Canada “but the violent acts that support it may be
close at hand”. Thirdly, the state is justified to take action that is
preventive or precautionary, and consider “possible future risks”. Fourthly,
Canada can further its national security through international cooperation
in the area of anti-terrorism220 and its security may be dependent on that of
another state.221
216
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C. UK
Rehman v Home Secretary222 concerned a Pakistani national whom the
UK government wanted to deport as “conducive to the public good”,223
namely, in the interests of national security because of his alleged
association with Islamic terrorist groups in the Indian subcontinent.
The Home Secretary alleged that with his activities Mr Rehman directly
supported a terrorist organization: first, Mr Rehman was recruiting British
Muslims for military training and fundraising for a terrorist group and
secondly, he was a “personal contact” of the world wide leader of two
related terrorist groups.224
Similarly to the case of Suresh, the executive government did not expect
Mr Rehman and his “followers” to engage in any violence in the UK, but
to continue to support and further the cause of terrorism outside of the UK.
The executive’s deportation decision was overturned by the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). The Court of Appeal
concluded that SIAC’s view of what constituted “national security” was
too narrow.
Whatever may have been the position in the past, increasingly the
security of one country is dependent upon the security of other
countries. That is why this country has entered into numerous
alliances. […] The establishment of NATO is but a reflection of
this reality. An attack on an ally can undermine the security of this
country.225
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The Court went further than the submission of the Attorney-General226
that in “alleged terrorist cases, a person may be said to be a danger to the
United Kingdom's national security if he or she engages in, promotes or
encourages violent activity which has, or is likely to have, adverse
repercussions on the security of the United Kingdom, its system of
government or its people.”227 The Court said that the repercussions could
be direct or indirect and “likely” was too high a threshold and “it is
sufficient if the adverse repercussions are of a kind which create a risk of
adverse repercussions.”228
But for all the talk about global cooperation and “adverse repercussions”
states can do little by way of prevention outside of traditional criminal
law. Where a person commits an offence (eg plots to commit a terrorist
act) they can be punished. When prevention is applied to people who
cannot be convicted of any offence, quite often it may be because the
extent of the global threat is more imaginary than real. In Australia only
two people, neither of whom is suspected of committing a crime in
Australia, have been subjected to a control order.229 If Canada or the UK
seriously wanted to fight terrorism they could have sought to prosecute Mr
Suresh or Mr Rehman in Canada or the UK respectively.
The Canadian and UK cases concerned people – allegedly dangerous
terrorist – whom the government wanted to deport.230 This system has
226
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been termed a “three walled prison“ because removing or deporting the
allegedly terrorists may allow them to start operating from elsewhere
without interference.231 The UK government itself referred to this
phenomenon as “exporting risk”.232
It is the fear of the unknown and potentially catastrophic future –
something might happen unless action is taken – which leads to the
making of control orders or an attempt to deport a person.
On the one hand, the threat of terrorism is vague and unknowable. Radical
uncertainty requires radical precaution. Courts in construing the meaning
of words – eg “terrorism”, “danger”, “national security” – err on the side
of caution and use a broad interpretation to ensure that the legislation
covers a wide field and is as effective as possible (eg organisations that
have existed for a long time and had nothing to do with 9/11 were
proscribed after September 2001).233
On the other hand, Ulrich Beck did not place terrorism on his list of
manufactured risks until after 9/11. As Ileana Porras argues, “terrorism”,
which since 9/11 it is often used synonymously with Al-Qaida and Osama
bin Laden, has become:234
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[T]he repository of everything that cannot be allowed to fit inside
the self image of democracy; […] it has become the “other” that
threatens, that desires the annihilation of the democratic “self” and
against which democracies therefore strenuously defend
themselves.
Mr Charkaoui’s interest in karate provided both a sufficient “connection”
to Al-Qaida – which gives the ultimate justification for any kind of antiterrorism measures. In Thomas, six out of the seven justices refer to 9/11,
Al Qaida or Osama bin Laden as the embodiment of “the mischief to
which the legislation is directed”,235 while simultaneously it was said that
the people who may want to commit acts of terrorism, are elusive and hard
to identify.236
Events or facts may have been of no interest to authorities some years ago
– an interest in martial arts (Mr Charkaoui), training in a camp in
Afghanistan in the 1990s or meeting Osama bin Laden briefly on three
occasions (Mr Thomas). But post 9/11 these facts are re-interpreted – by
the executive and the judiciary – and given a new significance.

V. CONCLUSION
In a 2007 article Greg Mythen asks whether ‘new terrorism’ is “perceived
as a significant threat, or a politically mediated red herring.”237 Although
we only considered a handful of cases, the answer seems to be that judges
perceive terrorism as a very significant threat.
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The limited evidence we examined suggests that courts have become
caught up in the fear of terrorism which has “become part and parcel of
the modern condition, the perception of society being at risk is pervasive
and self-conditioning.”238
Precautionary logic is ubiquitous in the decisions. The judiciary does not
appear to be a reluctant actor in the executive’s game of “decisionism”.
Overall, it is not a watchdog acting against executive attempts to
overreach. In the majority of the cases the judiciary adopts the
precautionary “better safe than sorry” approach.
In the decisions there are many references to the need to safeguard
individual human rights but national security usually prevails. Once the
executive has built the edifice called national security legislation, the
courts, in the decisions considered in this thesis (except for one), may get
the executive to repaint it – they may tinker with procedural safeguards or
the details of a control order – but the building stays in place.
The global terrorist threat serves as a justification for upholding the
validity of legislation with domestic remedies. The completely illogical
outcome is that often states seek to expel or move the ‘danger’. The
ticking bomb is not neutralised, it is moved elsewhere.
None of the legislation considered in this thesis involved proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Where the legislation does not provide for a precise
burden of proof several courts emphasise the need to use a burden of proof
lower than balance of probabilities. For most judges action is required
because a catastrophic terrorist act may happen.
Government are moving from unknown unknowns – not knowing who or
what to protect itself from – to what it believes to be known unknowns –
anyone who has any connection with terrorism, no matter how
insignificant, becomes a known. The most minor biographical detail, the
most casual acquaintance acquire sinister overtones. But why he is a
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danger or what he might do in the future remains unknown. Therein lies a
paradox: when trivial facts are construed as revealing a threat the stakes
are raised even higher to take precautionary measures.
The way the legislation operates is part of what has been called “targeted
governance” which operates on the basis of a set of measurable risk
factors such as Muslim religion, travel to certain countries at a certain time
(Afghanistan in the late 1990s) and so on. It is part of a “dream” of a
“‘smart,’ specific, side-effects-free, information-driven utopia of
governance.”239
While the discourse of precaution affects most of the decisions reviewed
in this thesis, more research is needed to confirm the presence of the logic
of precaution in judicial decision making. A larger sample of lower level
court decisions should reveal whether or not these are genuine trends.
Some words of cautious optimism. David Cole claims that if one considers
court decision over a longer period of time “judicial review of emergency
and national security measures can and has established important
constraints on the exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the
scope of what is acceptable in future emergencies.”240 However, if the
current war on terror is not an emergency but “the new normalcy”241 then
we should expect to see the judiciary continue to exhibit a disturbing
combination of deference to the executive together with a move away
from personal criminal responsibility for past acts to precautionary
measures against whole classes of people for potential future acts.
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